Land for peace?
An analysis of what went wrong
by Jonathan Kuttab

The collapse of the "peace process," and the subsequent cycle of bloodshed and violence that is currently raking Israel /Palestine, has left many of us confused, bewildered and without a clue.

Yet this collapse of the peace process should provide an opportunity to reconsider the whole process and to ask some serious questions as to whether it was not based on flawed premises that were bound to lead to such an outcome. It is also important to ask whether the fevered attempts to revive that process by the likes of the U.S. State Department, the CIA, and indeed Ariel Sharon, are worthy of the support of people of goodwill who are concerned about peace, justice and reconciliation.

The greatest success of the Israeli occupation and the Zionist movement in recent years has been in redefining the reality of the conflict and in creating a new narrative that has obtained worldwide currency and is rarely challenged. Yet it is precisely this narrative which has led to the current confusion and paralysis of the peace and justice community regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The process was thorough, pervasive, diabolical and ingenious, and successfully seduced, co-opted and neutralized the Palestinian leadership and most of the peace and justice community. It corrupted the vision of peace and justice and institutionalized a complex system for perpetuating and legitimizing continued oppression and occupation, with the acquiescence of the victims and their leadership.

To understand how this occurred, it is helpful to take a quick look back at where things stood right after the June 1967 War. Israel had recently won a stunning victory over its Arab neighbors and gained control of all historic Palestine, including Jerusalem, the rest of the West Bank, Gaza and other Arab territories from Egypt (the Sinai) and Syria (the Golan Heights).

Since that time, moderates on all sides developed the belief that a wonderful opportunity existed for ending the Arab-Israeli struggle through the formula of Land for Peace. Israel would return territory captured in that war in return for Arab acceptance and recognition of the State of Israel, which had been erected in Palestine at the expense of the local indigenous population. United Nations’ Resolution #242 enshrined this principle and further called for a just solution to the problem of refugees.

Arabs who had questions about the legitimacy of the state of Israel and the injustices done to the Palestinians in 1948 were urged to make a historic compromise and abandon their claim to 78 percent of historic Palestine in return for a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza; while Israelis were told they should give up the territories they conquered in that war in return for peace, legitimacy and genuine security. To be sure, there were plenty on both sides who resisted such a historic compromise, and some who actively worked to prevent it from becoming a reality, yet people of goodwill in both camps and throughout the world felt that only such a pragmatic compromise (the two-state solution) could address the equities on both sides and provide a meaningful outcome.

One obstacle to such a peace were people on each side who insisted on delegitimizing the Other and refused to recognize their identity or aspirations. There were Arabs who rejected Israel as an illegitimate racist state built by force of conquest on their land; and Israelis who denied Palestinians were a people, and who demonized their leadership, the PLO, and treated them as either nonexistent, or part of an amorphous Arab mass (who had 22 states anyway), or as being evil terrorists.

A second and more physical obstacle was the confiscation of Arab land in the Occupied Territories, and building therein exclusive Jewish settlements. Not only were these settlements illegal under international law (and as such constituted an unjust infringement on Arab property and rights); more importantly, they clearly undermined the possible pragmatic two-state solution, by dotting the very areas slated to become a Palestinian state with a hostile and intrusive permanent presence of continuously expanding Jewish settlements.

The first Intifada in 1987 brought the first rays of hope for peace. This largely nonviolent popular movement called for an end to occupation and successfully challenged the stereotypes of Palestinians as terrorists. It obtained widespread sympathy worldwide, and even inside Israel. It led to the famous handshake on the White House lawn, when it appeared that the first obstacle listed above had been eliminated and mutual recognition had finally taken place. No longer was each side denying the existence or legitimacy of the other.

Yet behind the facade of reconciliation was a very devious plan to utilize the very language, slogans and ideas of peaceful moderates to confirm, legitimize and consolidate the occupation and domination over the Palestinians. To understand how this successfully occurred, it is important to understand the mechanisms of the "peace agreement" and the "peace process" to see how it became the enemy of a genuine just peace and how it could never lead to the lasting peace and security that people of goodwill on all sides desire.

First, the "peace" agreements effectively neutralized international law, the United Nations and the international community, by positing the peace agreements themselves and the procedures laid down in them as a substitute.

In fact, the agreements became the only permitted method for adjudicating the disputes between the parties.

Second, the agreements failed to provide a meaningful method for resolving disputes, but stated that both parties (the very powerful and the very weak) would resolve all disputes between themselves. If they failed to agree, they may refer their differences (but only if both agree to do so) to the U.S. – Israel’s benefactor.

Third, the agreements left all matters of the slightest interest to the Israelis exclusively in their own hands (including all matters pertaining to Israeli settlers, security, underwater resources, movement in and out of the area, etc.); while matters of interest only to the Palestinians were left in the hands of numerous joint committees, where decisions had to be unanimous.

In all these committees, Israel had a veto, and could paralyze the daily life of Palestinians simply by refusing to meet in the joint committees.

Fourth, the Occupied Territories were divided into three types of non-contiguous zones, labeled A, B and C. Zone A territories were under Palestinian control, and composed primarily the dense populated city centers. There, Palestinians were supposed to be in full control – subject of course to the terms of the various agreements. Zone B territories were primarily the perimeters of villages, where Palestinians had civilian authority, but Israel had overriding "security control." Zone C lands constituted the Jewish settlements, connecting roads and everything else. These were left under the exclusive control of the Israeli military government. Because the areas under Palestinian control were non-contiguous, Israel could at any time thoroughly paralyze ordinary life in the Occupied Territories by cutting off the different areas from each other, turning the West Bank and Gaza into over 60 isolated cantons.

Fifth, the agreements left the most serious issues: Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, and borders, to be negotiated "at a later stage." This, in effect, meant that until that time arrived, Israel continued to exercise full and unfettered control in those areas. When Palestinians made complaints or demands regarding those issues, they were told they were violating the agreements, and that as long as there were no restrictions in the agreements about them, Israel was perfectly free to do as it wished and was not restricted by international law or anything else. Yet each and every one of these difficult issues continued on a daily basis to create problems and to rouse passions. The refugees stayed in their miserable exile, the settlements continued to flourish and expand at the expense of the local people and their land, Jerusalem continued to be under full Israeli control, illegally; and Israeli occupation continued with an air of legality, legitimacy, and even acquiescence by all who supported "the peace process," including the victims themselves.

Sixth, the agreements had no mechanism for enforcement or even monitoring of compliance. When Palestinians violated the agreements (for example, by not doing enough to prevent attacks by individuals within or coming from the areas under their control), Israel had a wide variety of sanctions to apply against them. When Israel violated the agreements or failed to fulfill its explicit requirements (for example, by failing to open free passage between Gaza and the West Bank, or failing to implement commitments for further redeployment – transferring areas by reclassifying them from Zone C to Zone A), Palestinians had no recourse whatsoever, and were prevented by the agreements from bringing the dispute to any other forum without Israel’s approval.

Seventh, the Palestinian leadership was placed in a very uncomfortable position. It was constantly being pressured to act as the occupation’s agent vis-à-vis its own people. As long as it did so, it enjoyed special privileges, freedom of movement for its senior personnel, money (taxes of Palestinian workers collected by the Israeli authorities and periodically transferred to it) to run its departments, and basic immunity from serious criticism for its inefficient and corrupt handling of the affairs of its own people. If, on the other hand, it insisted on representing their interests genuinely vis-à-vis the occupation, it came into direct conflict with Israel, was punished and sanctioned and ultimately told it could be "no longer viewed as a partner" and could face delegitimization again.

The sad thing is that many in the peace and justice community, who fought the demonization of the PLO and called for direct negotiations between the parties, were now in a poor position to challenge the whole "peace process" or to effectively critique the Palestinian National Authority for its own shortcomings. We bought the lie that the Oslo process was the only game in town, and succumbed to the propaganda that the only alternative to it is Hamas suicide bombings and a return to armed conflict.

Yet the present crisis in the peace process and the tensions it has caused can also present us with an opportunity to reassert principled positions regarding the whole conflict and to organize again around a program of action and positions that do not necessarily reflect the balance of power between the parties, but the balance of equities and a commitment to human beings on both sides of the conflict. We do not need magic formulae for "solving the problem" but to perceive directions leading toward a just and lasting peace. These positions should be a reflection of our ethics, beliefs and faith commitments, not just political bias. As a committed Christian who believes in peace, justice and reconciliation, I believe the following elements should be included in such a position:

• Giving greater weight to international law than to realpolitik. We must restore respect for things we hold to be universally true and applicable to friend and foe alike. They must include respect for human beings, collectively and individually, rather than respect for power and influence.
• A reassertion of our commitment to human rights and freedoms of individuals, and rejection of torture, the killing of innocent civilians, collective punishments and other forms of inhumane actions, regardless of whether they are perpetrated by Israel or the Palestinian National Authority.
• A rejection of violence and any policy aimed at finding a solution through military means, since this would only lead to loss of precious lives and an increase of bitterness and hatred, and will never achieve either justice or security. More weapons, and greater reliance on them, are only counterproductive.
• A uniform principled resistance to Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories as illegal and immoral elements that are not only unjust but also destructive for the possibility of a peaceful compromise. We must seek a united front of bringing international pressure to bear in the direction of a solution based on justice. This can include elements of boycotts, economic sanctions, nonviolent protests, and moral isolation of persons or institutions that support oppression and occupation. Israel is extremely sensitive to outside pressure, and often fancies itself as part of Europe and the Western world. It cannot tolerate for long being ostracized on moral grounds. Unlike the South African apartheid regime, it does not have the minerals and physical resources to withstand for long such ostracism. Yet in South Africa, it was precisely those sanctions, based on moral principles and international law, that brought the end to the apartheid regime; therefore those who are concerned with peace and justice should not belittle the moral power at their command if they seek a principled opposition to occupation, apartheid and repression as represented by the settlements.
• Finally, we must not let the agenda of our struggle for peace and justice be set by others who do not share our values. We must create our own narrative and be ever skeptical of the "solutions" cooked up by those primarily responsible for the problem. We must find the courage to resist the accepted wisdom regarding the peace process and insist on genuine peace that conforms to our ethics and values, even if it means rejecting the "peace" process.

Jonathan Kuttab is a Palestinian human rights lawyer who is on the board of Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center. See: www.fmep.org/images/maps/map0007_1.jpg for a map showing the West Bank after the Second Israeli Redeployment (FRD), according to the Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum.